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When is Knowing Less Better Than 
Knowing More? Unpacking the 
Controversy over Supreme Court 
Reference to Non-U.S. Law 
Mark Tushnet† 
Senator Jon Kyl asked John Roberts at his confirmation 
hearings, “[W]hat, if anything, is the proper role of foreign law 
in U.S. Supreme Court decisions?”1 Judge Roberts replied: 
[A]s a general matter, . . . [there are] a couple of things that cause 
concern on my part about the use of foreign law as precedent . . . . 
  The first has to do with democratic theory. Judicial decisions in 
this country—judges of course are not accountable to the people, but 
we are appointed through a process that allows for participation of 
the electorate, the President who nominates judges is obviously ac-
countable to the people. The senators who confirm judges are ac-
countable to the people. In that way the role of the judge is consistent 
with the democratic theory. If we’re relying on a decision from a Ger-
man judge about what our Constitution means, no President account-
able to the people appointed that judge, and no Senate accountable to 
the people confirmed that judge; and yet he’s playing a role in shaping 
a law that binds the people in this country. I think that’s a concern 
that has to be addressed. 
  The other part of it that would concern me is that relying on for-
eign precedent doesn’t confine judges. It doesn’t limit their discretion 
 
†  Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. I would like to thank participants at the Minnesota 
Law Review Symposium and at workshops at Cardozo Law School and George-
town University Law Center; Jeffrey Lehman, Eric Posner, and L. Michael 
Seidman for helpful comments; and Brian Simmonds for important research 
assistance. This Essay is a companion to Mark Tushnet, Referring to Foreign 
Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An Episode in the Culture Wars, 35 
BALT. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2006), where some of the ideas touched on 
here are developed in more detail. 
 1. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be 
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 200 (2005) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl, Member, S. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearing]. 
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the way relying on domestic precedent does. Domestic precedent can 
confine and shape the discretion of the judges. 
  In foreign law you can find anything you want. If you don’t find it 
in the decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or 
Japan or Indonesia or wherever. As somebody said in another context, 
looking at foreign law for support is like looking out over a crowd and 
picking out your friends. You can find them, they’re there. And that 
actually expands the discretion of the judge. It allows the judge to in-
corporate his or her own personal preferences, cloak them with the 
authority of precedent because they’re finding precedent in foreign 
law, and use that to determine the meaning of the Constitution. I 
think that’s a misuse of precedent, not a correct use of precedent.2 
Judge Roberts’s answers were perfectly suitable for the oc-
casion. Unfortunately, they are reflected in more academic 
works as what I think of as “talking-points scholarship,” that 
is, in articles that repeat a standard set of arguments that mis-
represent the claims made by those who sometimes refer to, or 
defend the occasional reference to, non-U.S. law in constitu-
tional interpretation.3 So, for example, I know of no one who be-
lieves that it is appropriate to use non-U.S. law as a precedent, 
where “precedent” is defined, as it should be, as a judicial hold-
ing that carries weight on grounds other than the correctness of 
the reasons provided by the court for its holding.4 Judge Rob-
 
 2. Id. at 200–01 (statement of Judge John Roberts).  
 3. Judge Roberts used a quotation from Judge Harold Leventhal (“look-
ing out over a crowd and picking out your friends”), id. at 201, that is com-
monly cited to Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative 
History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983). 
That quotation is an example of “talking-points”—and, in this instance, 
“sound-bite”—scholarship, when deployed in scholarly work. I could demon-
strate the existence of “talking-points scholarship” by providing string cites for 
every criticism I discuss here, where each criticism was supported by citations 
to the same articles. Doing so would, however, give the footnotes an undesir-
able ad hominem quality, and so I have refrained from providing more than 
one or two citations to support each criticism. The scare quotes I have used 
around the word “scholarship” signal my uneasiness about even engaging in 
this discussion. I suspect that academic criticisms of the use of non-U.S. law in 
constitutional interpretation would be more productively analyzed in terms of 
the sociology of scholarship than on the merits. 
 4. Judge Richard Posner understands the definitional point:  
  In [the] case . . . of controlling authority and that of authority that 
is not controlling . . . the earlier case is cited for the fact that the court 
has ruled one way or another, regardless of how persuasive the 
court’s reasoning is. It is cited because it is a precedent. It is quite 
something else to cite a decision by a foreign or international court 
not as a precedent but merely because it contains persuasive reason-
ing (a source or informational citation), just as one might cite a trea-
tise or a law review article because it was persuasive, not because it 
was considered to have any force as precedent or any authority. 
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erts’s other concern, that reference to non-U.S. law expands ju-
dicial discretion, is not distinctive to such references as is sug-
gested by his allusion to “another context”—the use of legisla-
tive history in statutory interpretation.5 
My goal in this Essay is simply to lay out the criticisms of 
the use of non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation, so as to 
identify what might be correct (not much, in the end) in those 
criticisms.6 I discuss criticisms based on theories of interpreta-
tion, on the claim that reference to non-U.S. law is merely deco-
ration playing no role in generating outcomes, on the role the 
Constitution has in expressing distinctively American values, 
and on the proposition that judges are unlikely to do a good job 
in understanding—and therefore in referring to—non-U.S. 
law.7 This last “quality-control” criticism has some validity, as 
does one version of the “expressivist” criticism, but only when 
they are formulated much more carefully than they have been 
in prior discussions of the issue. 
My general conclusions are these: the criticisms are either 
irrelevant, not distinctive to the use of non-U.S. law, or seri-
ously overstated. The structure of the irrelevance claim is sim-
ple: the validity of the criticism is entirely parasitic on some 
other argument—which is merely asserted, not defended—in 
the course of criticizing the references to non-U.S. law. The ir-
relevant criticisms apply other criticisms—deployed in a wide 
range of contexts, not just this one—of various judicial prac-
tices. The criticisms of references to non-U.S. law, that is, stand 
or fall with the validity of those other criticisms, and have little 
 
Richard Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., 
July–Aug. 2004, at 40, 41 [hereinafter Posner, No Thanks]. But see Richard A. 
Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 85 (2005) [hereinaf-
ter Posner, Political Court] (stating that foreign decisions were used as au-
thorities in Lawrence and Roper because they were looked to “for evidence of 
universality”). For a modest qualification of the proposition that no one relies 
on non-U.S. decisions as precedent, see infra notes 36–37 and accompanying 
text. 
 5. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 201 (statement of Judge 
John Roberts); Wald, supra note 3, at 214.  
 6. I should emphasize that my aim is not to defend the practice of refer-
ring to non-U.S. law in some ultimate normative sense. I personally would like 
to see the exercise of judicial review scaled back considerably, but for reasons 
that have nothing to do with the addition of non-U.S. law to the body of mate-
rials to which the Justices refer. My argument is that, given existing practices 
of judicial review, referring to non-U.S. law raises no particularly pressing 
concerns. 
 7. Clearly, some of these criticisms are related to others, and I have 
identified them as I have primarily for analytic convenience. 
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or no independent force. The structure of the nondistinctive-
ness argument is a bit more complex. These “nondistinctive” 
criticisms are applicable to a much wider range of practices 
than reference to non-U.S. law, but critics do not explain why 
they have taken as their target the practice of referring to non-
U.S. law. One reason might be that the practice is at present 
relatively unimportant and can be stifled before it becomes an 
important one. That is, the target is not the actual practice of 
referring to non-U.S. law but to some imagined practice that 
might develop out of the present one. Yet critics have provided 
no reasons why that development—which would involve the 
transformation of a practice that is defensible on its own terms 
into an indefensible one—will occur. 
I have tried to support what Professor Kenneth Anderson 
calls “Justice Breyer’s ‘no big deal’ view.”8 The references to 
non-U.S. law are few and nonthreatening, and the reaction to 
those references has been far out of proportion to their impor-
tance. Yet, one implication of the “no big deal” thesis is that it 
is no big deal one way or the other. We would not lose much 
were U.S. judges to conclude that the game of referring to non-
U.S. law was not worth the candle.9 
I.  THEORY-BASED CRITICISMS 
This Section discusses three classes of theory-based criti-
cisms of references to non-U.S. law: those based on a commit-
ment to originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation, 
those dealing with problems such references might pose within 
a pragmatic account of constitutional interpretation, and those 
dealing with what can roughly be called authority-based ac-
counts of constitutional interpretation. 
A. ORIGINALISM 
My sense is that by far the largest portion of the criticisms 
of reference to non-U.S. law rests on the view—held by consti-
tutional theorists and asserted occasionally by some Supreme 
Court Justices—that originalism is the only proper method of 
 
 8. Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, 131 POL’Y 
REV. 33, 39 (2005). 
 9. Not much, but something. The time may soon come when non-U.S. 
courts will grapple with novel issues—such as the regulation of genetic engi-
neering—before U.S. courts do. The non-U.S. courts may provide some in-
sights that would be useful when the U.S. courts later consider constitutional 
issues arising out of the same social phenomena. 
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constitutional interpretation. Originalist criticisms of reference 
to non-U.S. law exemplify the pattern in which criticisms of the 
targeted practice are entirely parasitic on other arguments 
(here the arguments for originalism itself). But, of course, those 
who refer to non-U.S. law are not originalists. Finding original-
ism inadequate as an account of constitutional interpretation, 
they have some other account. For them, originalist criticisms 
of their reference to non-U.S. law are irrelevant—at least until 
they are persuaded by the arguments for originalism itself. 
Even on originalist terms, reference to contemporary non-
U.S. law might sometimes be proper. An originalist inquiry 
might demonstrate that some particular constitutional provi-
sion, as originally understood,10 confers on judges in the future 
the power to take into account the positions taken in non-U.S. 
law at the time the interpretive issue arises.11 That, indeed, is 
at least part of the position the Supreme Court has taken with 
respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment. The Justices have said (whether they be-
lieve it or not is another question) that the terms “cruel and 
unusual” were understood to refer to “evolving standards of de-
cency,”12 and not to freeze into the law a ban on only those 
practices that were understood to be cruel and unusual in 
1791.13 Of course, other originalists might dispute the claim 
about the original understanding of the clause, and they might 
criticize Justices who accept that claim as bad originalists. This 
criticism seems to be about one practice, reference to non-U.S. 
law, but turns out to be a quite different criticism, that the tar-
geted practice rests on a mistaken application of originalist in-
terpretation. The critics might be right about the proper 
 
 10. I do not mean by using this term to take a position on the proper form 
of originalist theory. Originalists have offered a range of possibilities, and 
originalist theory, at least as seen from the outside, remains quite fluid, with 
new variants being introduced with some regularity. 
 11. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme 
Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Ju-
venile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 908 (2005), for this 
sort of clause-specific originalist account. In addition, contemporary British 
cases interpreting documents like the 1689 Bill of Rights might be relevant to 
the interpretation of constitutional provisions whose terms were drawn from 
such documents. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046–47 (1995) (mem. of 
Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (noting an opinion by two Eng-
lish judges interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments provision in the 
1689 Bill of Rights). 
 12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99–101 (1958). 
 13. See id. 
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originalist interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, but re-
gardless, they have no independent foundation for criticizing 
the references to non-U.S. law.14 
B. CRITICISMS FROM WITHIN PRAGMATIC THEORY 
The only theory-based criticisms with bite come from 
within the interpretive theory held by Justice Stephen Breyer, 
the Justice who refers to non-U.S. law. Justice Breyer has ar-
ticulated an approach that has correctly been called prag-
matic.15 The “quality-control” objections discussed below accept 
pragmatism’s premises. Two other criticisms from within 
pragmatic interpretive theory deserve mention. First, it is said 
that pragmatists are selective in their references to non-U.S. 
law. Second, pragmatists tend to be liberals, but fail to realize 
that a full-bore practice of referring to non-U.S. law might gen-
erate nonliberal results.16 The first criticism does not identify 
anything distinctive about referring to non-U.S. law; the second 
is irrelevant.17 
As have others, Judge Roberts suggested that reference to 
non-U.S. law is undesirable because judges who make such ref-
erences “cherry-pick” their sources, citing non-U.S. law that 
supports their preferences and ignoring non-U.S. law to the 
contrary.18 I have two observations about this criticism. First, it 
is not unique to reference to non-U.S. law, as indeed Judge 
 
 14. Put somewhat differently, the critics should not rest their criticisms 
on the ground that referring to non-U.S. law is inconsistent with an originalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, except in the empty sense that any 
purportedly originalist interpretation that is erroneous is not truly originalist. 
 15. See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Com-
parativism, 52 UCLA L. REV. 639, 692 (2005) (describing pragmatism as “the 
leading candidate for a constitutional theory that can credibly justify recourse 
to comparative material”). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 702 (“If pragmatic comparativism is employed, it may 
be to justify a diminishment rather than an enhancement of constitutional lib-
erties.”); Anderson, supra note 8, at 44–45 (“There is nothing in pragmatism 
that promises a particular vision of political progress . . . . [T]here is still a 
vast terrain of specifically American jurisprudence constraining the power of 
the state that progressivism might come to regret losing . . . .”). I note that Al-
ford’s formulation assumes that there is an already-agreed-upon baseline of 
constitutional liberties against which diminution or enhancement can be 
measured; yet in circumstances what is precisely at stake is the location of 
that baseline. 
 17. These criticisms are obviously related: the thought appears to be that 
the judges are selective because they desire to reach liberal results. 
 18. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 201 (statement of Judge 
John Roberts). 
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Roberts’s formulation suggests. The phrase about looking out 
over a crowd and picking out your friends comes from Judge 
Harold Leventhal, who used it to describe the use of legislative 
history in statutory interpretation.19 Justice Scalia’s campaign 
against legislative history appears to have failed in its largest 
ambitions because his colleagues disagree with him about un-
derlying questions of interpretive theory. So too, perhaps, in 
this context: the selectivity concern, like the originalist one, 
may be parasitic on a contested interpretive theory. 
Judge Roberts suggested that expanding the sources on 
which constitutional interpretation might be based inevitably 
expands judicial discretion.20 It is not clear to me why this is so. 
At least as an abstract proposition, looking at more material 
might produce greater rather than weaker constraints. But, 
even if Judge Roberts’s suggestion is correct, the real question 
is whether reference to non-U.S. law produces more than a 
marginal increase in judicial discretion in a world where—
under the interpretive theories the Justices appear to hold—
the judges already have a great deal of discretion. One might 
think that worrying about the increase in judicial discretion 
arising from occasional references to non-U.S. law—while ac-
cepting the discretion inherent in referring to the traditions of 
the American people, or indeed the discretion inherent in the 
actual practice of originalist interpretation—is to strain at a 
gnat while swallowing a camel.21 
Second, perhaps the selectivity criticism is simply a version 
of the “quality-control” criticism. The practice of referring to 
 
 19. See Wald, supra note 3, at 214. 
 20. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 201 (statement of Judge 
John Roberts). 
 21. Adrian Vermeule suggested in oral comments on an earlier version of 
this Essay that critics might appropriately target this source of discretion be-
cause it is easier to stop a new practice expanding discretion on a new margin 
than it is to cut back on an existing practice. Perhaps so, but it seems equally 
possible that the effort devoted to strangling the new practice, if expended 
against a larger target, might have larger effects. Nor is it clear that the prac-
tice is in fact new. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 11 (describing the his-
tory of references to non-U.S. law in constitutional adjudication); see also 
Mark Tushnet, Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An 
Episode in the Culture Wars, 35 BALT. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2006) (con-
sidering whether criticisms of non-U.S. law references are predicated on the 
view that early references might place us on a slippery slope). 
Issues of academic strategy might come into play as well. Perhaps there is 
an allocation of academic energy, with some critics targeting the new practice 
and others continuing to go after older ones. Or, having won (or lost) battles 
against older practices, maybe critics have turned to a new field of combat. 
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non-U.S. law seems relatively new to the judges who engage in 
it. Because they may not have developed the rhetorical tech-
niques for “distinguishing” adverse non-U.S. material, they ig-
nore it. As the practice matures, though, I think we can expect 
more complete references to non-U.S. law, along with the de-
velopment of appropriate techniques for distinguishing adverse 
material.22 
This latter version of the selectivity criticism blends into 
the “political tendency” criticism. Critics of pragmatic uses of 
non-U.S. material think it is a criticism to observe that a more 
comprehensive practice of referring to non-U.S. law might pro-
duce nonliberal results in some, perhaps many, instances.23 I 
find it hard to understand why this is a criticism. I would think 
that the appropriate response is, “So what? I [that is, the per-
son making the references to non-U.S. law] have no a priori 
commitment to liberal outcomes, and if it turns out that refer-
ences to non-U.S. law produce conservative results, so be it.” 
 
 22. It seems that some criteria for identifying nations whose law might 
appropriately be referred to are emerging. For example, references to the law 
of nations that can fairly be described as reasonably well-functioning democra-
cies are more appropriate than references to the law of other nations. See Rex 
D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of 
Foreign Persuasive Authority, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 357, 361 (2005). Also, refer-
ences to the law of nations where the law-on-the-books fits reasonably well 
with the law-in-action are more appropriate than references to the law of na-
tions where the gap between the former and the latter is substantially larger. 
See id. And, related to the prior point, references to the law of nations where 
judges and other decision makers reasonably believe that their decisions 
might actually affect government operation and citizens’ lives are more appro-
priate than references to the law of nations where judges and some other deci-
sion makers operate without much impact on daily life. See id. Glensy offers 
three parameters to guide courts in locating foreign authority. See id. First, 
“the democratic quotient of the institutional body which American courts are 
proposing to cite;” second, “the societal affinities that the nation which origi-
nated the proposed persuasive authority shares with the United States;” and 
third, a “purely practical” criterion. Id. I take it that some combination of 
these criteria account for Justice Breyer’s acknowledgement that his reference 
to a decision by a Zimbabwean court might have been inappropriate. See 
Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia 
and Stephen Breyer (Jan. 13, 2005), http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/ 
mediarel.nsf (follow “AU News Releases–Category” hyperlink; then follow 
“Speeches on Campus” hyperlink; then follow “2005” hyperlink; then follow 
“January” hyperlink; then follow “Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer – AU Washington 
College of Law, Jan. 13” hyperlink) [hereinafter Transcript]. Clearly, though, 
more work needs to be done on this topic. In Part IV, I further address the 
concern that other nations are not “enough” like the United States to support 
comparisons.  
 23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
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The best I can devise is this: the criticism might be a sort 
of truncated argument from hypocrisy or, in Justice Scalia’s 
term, “sophistry,”24 charging those who refer to non-U.S. law 
with doing so only when the references support liberal posi-
tions. So, for example, Justice Scalia noted that the Supreme 
Court applies the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment 
cases even though no other major jurisdiction does so; that the 
Supreme Court has adopted an account of nonestablishment 
and its evils that is inconsistent with practices elsewhere; and 
that the Supreme Court’s abortion decisions have made the 
United States “one of only six countries that allow abortion on 
demand until the point of viability.”25 
Three observations are appropriate here. First, the refer-
ences to non-U.S. law are rare enough that one cannot fairly 
accuse the judges who engage in the practice of being hypocriti-
cal26—or, at least of being any more hypocritical in referring to 
non-U.S. law than they and their colleagues are throughout 
their work.27 Second, the underdeveloped practice of distin-
guishing adverse material might account for the purported in-
consistencies. That is, the judges who refer to non-U.S. law may 
have an as-yet unarticulated account of why the death penalty 
and gay rights are different from abortion and nonestablish-
ment in a way relevant to the practice of referring to non-U.S. 
law. Finally, conservative critics have engaged in a sort of uni-
lateral disarmament. Because they oppose references to non-
U.S. law in principle, they do not provide their allies on the 
Court with non-U.S. material that bears on the issues in spe-
cific cases before the Court or that would force their adversar-
ies on the Court to confront adverse non-U.S. material.28 Under 
 
 24. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it 
otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.”). 
 25. Id. at 625. Much of the force of Justice Scalia’s observation comes from 
his characterization of U.S. law, which is not, in my view, accurate. 
 26. Alford, supra note 15, at 702, refers to “the paucity of pragmatic juris-
prudence that relies on comparative experiences.” 
 27. This seems to me the general thesis of Posner, Political Court, supra 
note 4, and so it would be wrong to take Judge Posner’s comments on the prac-
tice of referring to non-U.S. law as doing anything other than giving an exam-
ple of a pervasive hypocrisy in constitutional adjudication. 
 28. Compare this view with the view Posner expresses in Posner, Political 
Court, supra note 4, at 86:  
Justice Scalia could turn from denouncing the citation of foreign deci-
sions by his colleagues to casting his own net wide enough to haul in 
precedents supporting his views on homosexuality, abortion, capital 
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these circumstances, it is at least premature to charge those 
who refer to non-U.S. law with hypocrisy.29 
C. AUTHORITY-BASED CONCERNS 
Finally, one might call criticism of using non-U.S. law as 
precedent a theory-based criticism but for the fact, noted ear-
lier, that no one who thinks it appropriate to refer to non-U.S. 
law treats it as precedent. A precedent, strictly speaking, is a 
decision that carries normative weight because of the authority 
of the court that issues it and not because of the reasons that 
support it.30 Precedents matter only when one might disagree 
with the reasons for the decision but nonetheless accede to the 
authority of the issuing court. 
Consider an obviously appropriate reference to a non-U.S. 
source. U.S. constitutional doctrine on the liability of the news 
media for false statements about public figures has attracted 
widespread criticism around the world and in the United 
States.31 Suppose a Justice is faced with a new case testing the 
limits of existing libel doctrine, and believes that the First 
Amendment should not extend protection to the media under 
the circumstances presented, for reasons going to the balance 
between speech and privacy inherent in constitutionalized libel 
law. And suppose the Justice writes an opinion saying, “Justice 
Anthony Mason of the Australian High Court cogently ex-
pressed my concerns in terms on which I cannot improve,” and 
then quotes Mason’s opinion. Here, the Justice refers to a non-
U.S. source of law—a source that does indeed have precedential 
weight within Australia—but does not use the source as a 
 
punishment, and the role of religion in public life—for such prece-
dents are abundant in the world’s courts.  
Conservatives’ choice to not present non-U.S. law that supports their posi-
tions may explain the result that references to non-U.S. law typically support 
liberal conclusions. But not always. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 
(2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (referring to non-U.S. law as illustrating that 
the “international understanding of the office of affirmative action” is that 
such programs should be time-limited). 
 29. Justice Breyer has said that the correct response to improper selectiv-
ity of non-U.S. references is to expand the set of references. See Transcript, 
supra note 22. In general, that is right, unless the effort to expand the set 
would induce more or a different kind of error. For a discussion of this possibil-
ity, see infra Part IV. 
 30. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1214–15 (8th ed. 2004); Posner, No 
Thanks, supra note 4, at 41. 
 31. See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 848–
49 (2003) (citing non-U.S. and U.S. criticisms of U.S. constitutional libel law). 
TUSHNET_3FMT 05/17/2006 09:18:05 AM 
2006] REFERENCES TO NON-U.S. LAW 1285 
 
precedent. The Justice relies on Mason’s opinion because of the 
reasons it contains, not because of its authority as precedent. 
Similarly, the cases that have generated the most severe 
criticism do not use non-U.S. law as precedents in the appro-
priate sense. In Atkins v. Virginia32 and Roper v. Simmons33 
the Court engaged in what Ernest Young calls “nose-counting,” 
toting up the number of nations that rejected, at least in prin-
ciple, the aspects of capital punishment at issue in those 
cases.34 There are problems with nose-counting when used for 
some purposes, such as the potential gap between articulated 
principle and actual practice, and the failure to weight nations 
by population or degree of democratic governance. When nose-
counting is used as the Court has used it—to check that a 
judgment independently arrived at is not wildly inconsistent 
with judgments elsewhere—the practice hardly seems worthy 
of the ire it has attracted.35 And, of course, nose-counting is 
precisely not using non-U.S. law as precedent. 
Professor Vicki Jackson has suggested the only ground on 
which any advocate of referring to non-U.S. law might treat 
non-U.S. decisions as something like precedents. In canvassing 
the sources of normative guidance for interpretation, a judge 
might acknowledge that someone with responsibility for mak-
ing decisions that have real-world effects (like a judge) might 
provide a better path to normative judgment than someone who 
does not have that kind of immediate responsibility (a philoso-
 
 32. 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
 33. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 34. Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 148, 150–51 (2005); see Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78; Atkins, 536 
U.S. at 316–17 n.21; see also Mark Tushnet, How (and How Not) to Use Com-
parative Constitutional Law in Basic Constitutional Law Courses, 49 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 671, 673 (2005) (referring to “nose-counting on bottom-line re-
sults”). 
 35. This formulation rests on the proposition that the Court in Roper 
meant what it said when it asserted that its independent judgment was “con-
firm[ed]” by the “opinion of the world community.” 543 U.S. at 578. I see no 
reason to doubt the Court’s word. Compare this view to the one expressed by 
Posner:  
If I were writing an opinion invalidating the life sentence in my hypo-
thetical marijuana case I would look at the punishments for this con-
duct . . . in the foreign countries . . . that we consider in some sense 
our peers. If a law could be said to be contrary to world public opinion 
I would consider this a reason, not compelling but not negligible ei-
ther, for regarding a state law as unconstitutional even if the Consti-
tution’s text had to be stretched a bit to cover it. 
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 13 (1996). 
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pher, perhaps).36 In such circumstances, the very fact that a de-
cision is made by a judge does carry some weight by providing 
something akin to a warranty that the decision maker was fully 
serious in arriving at his or her normative conclusion.37 Though 
this is related to treating a decision as a precedent, it is not ac-
tually doing so. In any event, Professor Jackson’s argument 
remains at present purely theoretical, because no Supreme 
Court decision or even opinion uses non-U.S. authority to bol-
ster constitutional interpretation in this way. 
Finally, Judge Roberts’s reference to “precedents” created 
by German judges who are not appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate38 hints at a final concern, that refer-
ence to non-U.S. law somehow undermines U.S. sovereignty. As 
I have argued elsewhere (and without refutation of which I am 
aware) U.S. sovereignty is not undermined when judges ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate—that is, 
the Justices of the Supreme Court—make a decision for them-
selves to refer to non-U.S. sources of law.39 Consider Kenneth 
Anderson’s formulation. For him, reference to non-U.S. law is 
a violation of the compact between government and governed, free 
people who choose to give up a measure of their liberties in return for 
the benefits of government—a particular pact with a particular com-
munity, in which the materials used in the countermajoritarian act of 
judging them nonetheless have, in some fashion, even indirectly, de-
mocratic provenance and consent.40 
The decision by the Justices to refer to non-U.S. law gives 
that law “indirect” democratic provenance—or, at least, makes 
that reference indistinguishable from the indirect provenance 
of whatever sources the Justices refer to when they interpret 
 
 36. See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resis-
tance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 118 (2005). 
 37. Professor Jackson’s argument might help identify some of the contours 
of the universe of nations to whose law references might be made. Some con-
stitutional courts might be ineffective, which means that their judges do not 
have true responsibility for making decisions that affect people’s lives. And, to 
the extent that constitutional courts exercise abstract review, particularly pre-
enactment abstract review (as with the French Conseil Constitutionnel and 
with some aspects of the reference jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada), their sense of responsibility and connection to real-world problems may 
be diminished. 
 38. See Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1, at 200–01 (statement of 
Judge John Roberts). 
 39. Mark Tushnet, Transnational/Domestic Constitutional Law, 37 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 239, 262–63 (2003). 
 40. Anderson, supra note 8, at 49. 
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the Constitution using an approach other than originalism.41 
Roger Alford suggests that “[c]omparativism is inconsistent 
with political democracy” because “there is no democratic check 
that the United States can impose upon the rulemaking power 
of foreign courts.”42 Again, though, the check lies in the ability 
of U.S. judges to decide for themselves when and to what extent 
they will refer to non-U.S. law. Or, finally, consider Ernest 
Young’s formulation: “importing foreign law into the domestic 
legal system through constitutional interpretation circumvents 
the institutional mechanisms by which the political branches 
ordinarily control the interaction between the domestic and the 
foreign.”43 Again, the relevant institutional mechanisms are 
those of the appointment process, unless one places unwar-
ranted weight on the term “ordinary” in Professor Young’s for-
mulation.44 
II.  “IRRELEVANCE” CRITICISMS 
If the theory-based criticisms are concerned that Justices 
are taking non-U.S. law too seriously, another criticism—oddly, 
sometimes deployed by the same critics—seems to be that the 
Justices do not take non-U.S. law seriously enough. According 
to this criticism, the references to non-U.S. law are “decora-
tions” or “ornamentation.”45 They do no analytic work. Of 
 
 41. See id. 
 42. Alford, supra note 15, at 709–10. 
 43. Young, supra note 34, at 163. 
 44. I note that there are two areas in which there might properly be con-
cern over the reduction of domestic sovereignty: decisions by arbitral tribunals 
under the North American Free Trade Agreement, and, somewhat less so, de-
cisions by the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization. Even with re-
spect to those institutions, I think the “sovereignty” criticisms are overstated. 
See Tushnet, supra note 39, at 251–57. But, in any event, no Supreme Court 
cases involve those institutions, and so I do not discuss them here except to 
note that critics of the Supreme Court’s reference to non-U.S. law sometimes 
confusingly throw in discussions of those tribunals. See, e.g., Anderson, supra 
note 8, at 47–49; Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 2010–12 (2004). 
 45. Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Consti-
tution: Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 363 (2004) (“The citation is 
mere ornamentation . . . .”); Posner, No Thanks, supra note 4, at 42 (describing 
reference to non-U.S. law as “fig-leafing”); see Posner, Political Court, supra 
note 4, at 88 (“Our Justices cite foreign decisions . . . [because] they are timid 
about speaking in their own voices lest the mask slip and legal justice be re-
vealed as personal or political justice.”); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the 
Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129, 137–38 (2005) (“Perhaps judges 
are embarrassed to make moral pronouncements in their own voice, even un-
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course, if that is so, one wonders why anyone would bother to 
criticize the references.46 Judge Posner suggests one reason: the 
citations are not really mere decorations, but reflect a sort of 
intellectual laziness, a refusal to accept responsibility for mak-
ing one’s own decision.47 
Judge Posner has also provided the response to this con-
cern. Considered merely as decorations, references to non-U.S. 
law are indistinguishable from citations of law review arti-
cles,48 or, indeed, citations of any material that the judge ac-
knowledges is not binding. So, for example, Justice Scalia’s ref-
erence to popular music49 and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
reference to poetry50 are subject to the same criticism.51 
Whether a reference to non-U.S. law is more effective than a 
reference to popular music is a question of rhetoric, not of legal 
theory.52 
The “mere decoration” criticism, then, is about a whole 
range of opinion-writing practices, not distinctively about refer-
ences to non-U.S. law.53 I personally do not find compelling 
 
der the cover of the objectivity of natural law. . . . Reference to official judg-
ments, whether local or foreign, helps rescue judges from a feeling of intellec-
tual nakedness.”). 
 46. For intellectual reasons, that is; people might bother because of xeno-
phobia. 
 47. See Posner, No Thanks, supra note 4, at 42 (“Judges . . . are timid 
about speaking in their own voices lest they make legal justice seem too per-
sonal and discontinuous.”). 
 48. Cf. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Comments at the University of Ha-
waii Law Review Symposium: To What Extent Should the Interpretation and 
Application of Provisions of the U.S. Constitution Be Informed by Rulings of 
Foreign and International Tribunals, in 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 335, 335 (2004) 
(“In one sense, we use foreign decisions . . . as an ornament . . . the way a law 
professor’s commentary is.”). 
 49. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (referring to Cole Porter’s “You’re the Top”). 
 50. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 424 n.25 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting John Greenleaf Whittier’s “Barbara Frietchie”). 
 51. Calling something a decoration suggests that the critic is relying on 
some account of good literary style. And, perhaps, there is some such account 
in which references to non-U.S. law are bad decorations while references to 
popular music and poetry are good decorations. Once again, though, the criti-
cism of the references to non-U.S. law are parasitic upon some other—here, 
unexpressed—theory. 
 52. Answering the question requires attentiveness to the fact that opin-
ions have various audiences, and that one audience may admire a reference 
that another audience derides. 
 53. Another concern might be that references to non-U.S. law either are 
irrelevant, in which case they should be treated as mere decoration, or make 
some marginal contribution to the result, in which case the references carry 
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Judge Posner’s suggestion that decorative citations are efforts 
to deny responsibility for exercising lawmaking authority. Even 
if he is correct, making references to non-U.S. law the focal 
point for this much broader concern seems strikingly mis-
placed. A campaign to reform citation practices ought to start 
elsewhere, because the campaign is unlikely to move beyond ci-
tations to non-U.S. law if such citations are its first target.54 
III.  EXPRESSIVIST CRITICISMS 
A tradition going back to Montesquieu treats the domestic 
law of each nation as uniquely the product of, and suitable to, 
the history and conditions of that nation.55 A nation’s law, that 
is, expresses something distinctive about that nation alone. As 
Sanford Levinson puts it, determining what a nation’s law is 
might involve “trying to figure out what constitutes a particular 
society’s way of expressing values in the world.”56 On this view, 
there could be something odd about incorporating the law of 
another nation into one’s own law. Expressivist views of domes-
tic law form the basis for another criticism of references to non-
U.S. law in constitutional interpretation. 
A. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM VERSUS ENGAGEMENT WITH 
THE WORLD 
One—but only one—understanding of the United States 
emphasizes American exceptionalism. In Levinson’s terms, the 
United States has “a distinctly different political tradition” 
even from that of Europe.57 He uses the example of controver-
sies over the wearing of head scarves in school. French law em-
 
some weight, although not as precedent. Judges who refer to non-U.S. law fail 
to indicate into which category particular references fall, and thereby obscure 
the real sources of their decisions. In response, I suggest that identifying the 
category is not at all difficult in those few cases that make controversial refer-
ences to non-U.S. law. 
 54. This observation is inapposite to Judge Posner, who is about as aus-
tere in his citation practices as any prominent modern judge has ever been. 
 55. See 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 6 (Thomas Nu-
gent trans., rev. ed., New York, The Colonial Press 1899) (1751) (“[T]he gov-
ernment most conformable to nature is that which best agrees with the humor 
and disposition of the people in whose favor it is established.”). 
 56. Levinson, supra note 45, at 363; see also Waldron, supra note 45, at 
139 (“Some have speculated that law is essentially relative to local condi-
tions . . . . Others have suggested that law is essentially relative to the peculi-
arities of local customs.”). 
 57. Levinson, supra note 45, at 362. 
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bodies a nonestablishment principle that its political leaders 
have taken to require the elimination of symbols, including 
head scarves that conspicuously manifest a religious affilia-
tion.58 Levinson suggests that we in the United States should 
be skeptical of the claim that the French version of nonestab-
lishment is at all relevant to the U.S. nonestablishment princi-
ple, because of our different traditions.59 Similarly, Jed 
Rubenfeld writes, “In American constitutionalism, the U.S. 
Constitution is supposed to reflect our own fundamental legal 
and political commitments . . . . It is the self-givenness of the 
Constitution . . . that gives it authority as law.”60 
All this may be true enough, but the real question is, “what 
are the fundamental commitments we have given to ourselves 
in the Constitution?” That is a historical and empirical ques-
tion, not a conceptual one. Those who believe that references to 
non-U.S. law are appropriate in constitutional interpretation 
could respond to these expressivist criticisms by contending, 
and not unreasonably, that such references are consistent with 
the vision the United States has of itself. 
There is indeed one vision of the United States according to 
which our constitutive commitments are unique in the world. 
But that is only one vision of the United States. Another, at 
least equally important in U.S. history and to our self-
understanding, is captured in several phrases. John Winthrop61 
 
 58. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République 
Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190, available 
at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleTexte.jsp (search 
“Numero du texte” for “2004-228”; then follow “LOI n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 
2004 Texte d’origine” hyperlink).  
 59. Levinson, supra note 45, at 362. 
 60. Rubenfeld, supra note 44, at 2006. Given the prominence this article 
has in the critical literature, I must note that Rubenfeld’s article contains nu-
merous errors or gross oversimplifications, some of which go to the arguments 
relevant in the present context. Among other things, he asserts that the 
“European view” of human rights takes them to be “uniform throughout the 
world.” Id. at 2004. This overlooks the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, 
which allows for variation in human rights even within Europe. See, e.g., 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. 737, 753–54 (1976). Rubenfeld 
also writes that “European constitutionalism . . . [has broken] radically from 
its Kelsenian roots . . . [but] has not yet fully confronted the significance of this 
departure,” Rubenfeld, supra note 44, at 1996, without citation to relevant 
European sources. 
 61. John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity, in MASS. HISTORICAL 
SOC’Y, 2 WINTHROP PAPERS (BOSTON, 1929–47), reprinted in DARRETT B. 
RUTMAN, JOHN WINTHROP’S DECISION FOR AMERICA: 1629, at 94, 100 (Harold 
M. Hyman ed., 1975) (“wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people 
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and, several hundred years later, Ronald Reagan,62 described 
us as a “city upon a hill.” Abraham Lincoln called the United 
States the “last best, hope of earth.”63 And, in what is coming to 
be the most common quotation used in support of the practice 
of referring to non-U.S. law, the signers of the Declaration of 
Independence asserted that “a decent respect to the opinions of 
mankind require[d]” them to explain their reasons for rebel-
lion.64 
Each of these quotations captures something about the 
U.S. self-understanding that the American exceptionalist vision 
does not. Of course, each takes the form of asserting that our 
behavior will be a model for others, and not—directly—that 
what others do matters to us.65 And yet, the quotations express 
a view of the United States as engaged with the world. Merely 
broadcasting our own positions might not count as the kind of 
engagement that would allow the United States to serve as a 
“beacon,” in President Reagan’s formulation, for others.66 
 
 
are uppon us”). 
 62. Farewell Address to the Nation, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1718, 1722 (Jan. 11, 
1989) (“The past few days when I’ve been at that window upstairs, I’ve 
thought a bit of the ‘shining city upon a hill’ . . . . And how stands the city on 
this winter night? . . . [S]he’s still a beacon, still a magnet for all who must 
have freedom, for all the pilgrims from all the lost places who are hurtling 
through the darkness, toward home.”). 
 63. Abraham Lincoln, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in 5 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 518, 537 (Roy P. Basler ed., 
1953).  
 64. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 65. For a discussion of this point in connection with the Declaration of In-
dependence, see Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Man-
kind”: International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 
261 (2005). See also Anderson, supra note 8, at 38 (pointing out that the “de-
cent respect” phrase refers to the need to explain rebellion “in terms that the 
rest of mankind might understand”). Kontorovich offers a number of entirely 
plausible prudential reasons for the signers’ interest in explaining themselves 
to other nations, but I believe he fails to provide an adequate account of why 
they thought they were “required” to do so. 
 66. A stronger version of the argument about the kind of engagement en-
tailed by the “decent respect” phrase could be based on the philosophical psy-
chology of the Scottish Enlightenment, which modern scholars have argued 
was the conceptual underpinning of the Declaration as a whole. See, e.g., 
GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA 236–38, 316–18 (1978). So, for example, 
coming up with “terms that the rest of mankind might understand,” Anderson, 
supra note 8, at 38, might require a reciprocal engagement that references to 
non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation might exemplify. I understand 
that this argument is seriously underdeveloped, and hope to expand upon it in 
another essay. 
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Add some prudential considerations to the general vision of 
the United States as engaged with the world, and references to 
non-U.S. law in constitutional interpretation become an even 
more evident technique of identifying what our self-given con-
stitution (and Constitution) is. Perhaps merely explaining our-
selves might have been enough in 1776 or 1862. But today, oth-
ers will not listen unless we display some reciprocity.67 To 
influence others, as this vision of our national self-constitution 
would have us do, we now must listen to them. Or, at least, so 
might some think. The expressivist criticism of references to 
non-U.S. law overlooks this dimension of our national self-
understanding. 
B. OTHER EXPRESSIVIST CONCERNS 
Some versions of expressivist criticisms are narrower, oth-
ers broader, than the central expressivist criticism I have dis-
cussed. A narrower criticism is that references to non-U.S. law 
in cases applying human rights norms to state governments fail 
to take account of the distinctively American version of federal-
ism. But, as with originalist criticisms, this one is badly framed 
as a criticism of references to non-U.S. law in such cases. The 
federalism problem, if it exists, arises from the incorporation of 
the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. That is, in-
corporation is itself insensitive to federalism.68 
Consider in this context differences between two types of 
challenge to capital punishment. First, the broad-scale attack: 
at least as of today, the Supreme Court holds that the Eighth 
Amendment—and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment—does 
not prohibit governments from imposing capital punishment in 
appropriate cases.69 One reason for that holding is that, today, 
normative disagreement among the people of the United 
States, expressed in differences in state laws authorizing or 
failing to authorize capital punishment, requires that some lo-
cations be allowed to have capital punishment. The interpreta-
 
 67. Perhaps the anxiety generated by this implicit comment on the 
changed position of the United States as a moral force in the world accounts 
for some of the intense opposition to non-U.S. law references in U.S. decisions. 
 68. Incorporation is insensitive to federalism except to the extent that one 
interprets specific provisions in the Bill of Rights so as to take local variation 
into account. 
 69. I put aside the technical point that the Fourteenth Amendment might 
contain specific prohibitions on the administration of capital punishment that 
are independent of those contained in the Eighth Amendment. 
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tion of the Eighth Amendment, that is, derives from aspects of 
American federalism. Reference to non-U.S. law in broad-scale 
attacks on the death penalty would be inappropriate as long as 
federalism is thought relevant to interpreting the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Second, attacks on particular aspects 
of death penalty administration: by giving weight to antideath 
penalty trends within the United States, decisions like Atkins 
and Roper explicitly assert that normative variation within the 
United States is not relevant to the constitutional questions 
presented in those cases.70 And precisely for that reason, the 
expressivist concern about federalism is irrelevant in those 
cases. 
Jot-for-jot incorporation—that is, the rule that normative 
variation among the states is not relevant to interpreting the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights—might be a bad idea,71 but it 
expresses a vision of the United States as a single entity for 
certain human rights purposes. Given that vision, the observa-
tion that references to non-U.S. law are insensitive to federal-
ism is inapposite. 
The broadest expressivist criticism of reference to non-U.S. 
law in constitutional interpretation takes the strongly relativist 
position that justice itself is context-specific.72 As Levinson 
points out, this is a surprising stance for conservatives to 
take.73 Whatever one thinks their views are,74 the critics have 
provided no reason to believe that those who refer to non-U.S. 
law are relativists—indeed, one would think that the inference 
to be drawn from their practice is precisely the opposite. And, 
obviously, once again we have a criticism whose validity de-
pends entirely on the validity of another and plainly contest-
able position, here relativism. If relativism is correct, the rela- 
 
 
 70. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 565–66, (2005); Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–17 (2002). 
 71. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 181 (1968) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing “jot-for-jot” incorporation). 
 72. See Levinson, supra note 45, at 361. Levinson asserts that “what dis-
tinguishes Albanians from Zimbabweans . . . include[s] quite different concep-
tions of justice . . . . [I]t is indeed impossible to engage in the truly impersonal 
assessment of one or another aspect of the culture,” including its conception of 
justice. Id. 
 73. See id. at 361–62. 
 74. Recall my discussion of the “politically selective” criticism. See supra 
notes 23–29 and accompanying text. Observing an apparent tension between a 
criticism and a belief imputed to the critics does not in itself demonstrate the 
invalidity of the criticism, but raises a suspicion of sophistry or hypocrisy. 
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tivism-based criticism of references to non-U.S. law is correct 
as well—but if not, it fails. 
IV.  QUALITY-CONTROL CRITICISMS 
The most cogent criticism of references to non-U.S. law in 
constitutional interpretation is surely that such references are 
likely to be wrong. We have to begin with what is basically a 
pragmatic defense of such references. Those who refer to non-
U.S. law think that looking elsewhere provides information 
that might be helpful in addressing domestic interpretive ques-
tions. This is because judges in other nations are confronting 
the same, or at least quite similar, questions although the con-
stitutional language they are interpreting and the history from 
which that language emerged are different from the language 
and history of the U.S. Constitution. We can learn something, 
proponents of such references believe, from seeing how other 
responsible people have addressed problems that are the same 
as, or at least quite similar to, the ones we face. And, after all, 
how can it be a bad thing to know more about how others have 
dealt with similar problems? As Professor Anderson puts it, as 
a preface to his criticism of the point, “Who wants to say that 
ignorance is the best policy . . . ?”75 
Critics have a simple answer to that question. References 
to non-U.S. law are likely to be misleading when U.S. judges 
mistakenly think that they are dealing with the same questions 
as are non-U.S. judges. It is not merely that constitutional lan-
guage differs. More important, as Judge Posner puts it, “foreign 
decisions emerge from complex social, political, cultural, and 
historical backgrounds of which Supreme Court Justices, like 
other American judges and lawyers, are largely ignorant.”76 
The scope of the problem is illustrated by one prominent 
reference to non-U.S. law, particularly because Justice Breyer 
 
 75. Anderson, supra note 8, at 39. He continues,  
Surely one does not want to tell a judge to increase his or her igno-
rance of how things are done in other places. And if that position is 
rejected . . . , then it would be disingenuous for a judge not to ac-
knowledge the source of his or her knowledge, even if it just happened 
to be an opinion in a case from the constitutional court of some other 
country.  
Id. 
 76. Posner, Political Court, supra note 4, at 86; see also Anderson, supra 
note 8, at 46 (“The effect [of citing non-U.S. law] is to deracinate the judicial 
texts of other legal systems, to strip them out of the particular social settings 
that animate them . . . .”). 
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is the culprit. In Printz v. United States, he supported his view 
that national statutes requiring state executive officials to en-
force national law were not inconsistent with the basic values 
of federalism by pointing to Germany’s federalism.77 There, he 
correctly observed, national law is essentially always enforced 
by state executive officials. The German experience, Justice 
Breyer wrote, might “cast an empirical light on the conse-
quences of different solutions to a common legal problem—in 
this case the problem of reconciling central authority with the 
need to preserve the liberty-enhancing autonomy of a smaller 
constituent governmental entity.”78 He acknowledged that 
“there may be relevant political and structural differences be-
tween their systems and our own,” as indeed there are.79 As 
Daniel Halberstam has shown, the German subnational units 
have a much more substantial role in enacting German na-
tional legislation than do the states in the United States.80 This 
institutional difference certainly has some bearing on the 
“common legal problem” to which Justice Breyer referred—to 
the point where the “empirical light” cast on the problem is 
quite dim. Or, put another way, the institutional differences 
are so great that what Justice Breyer asserted was a “common 
legal problem” was not in fact a single problem faced by two 
systems, but two distinct problems. 
Another example is provided by the regulation of hate 
speech. Advocates of the position that such regulation should 
not be held to violate the First Amendment point to experiences 
in Canada and Great Britain, where the regulation of hate 
speech has not led to comprehensive speech-suppression.81 But, 
as I have argued elsewhere, this overlooks the important insti-
tutional differences between the United States and those na-
tions.82 Far more prosecutors would be authorized to institute 
 
 77. 521 U.S. 898, 976–78 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. at 977. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Com-
mandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION 213, 235–38 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & 
Robert Howse eds., 2001). 
 81. See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Consider-
ing the Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2341–48 (1989) (describing the 
development of international human rights law in connection with hate 
speech). 
 82. Mark Tushnet, Interpreting Constitutions Comparatively: Some Cau-
tionary Notes, with Reference to Affirmative Action, 36 CONN. L. REV. 649, 
650–52 (2004). 
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hate-speech prosecutions in the United States than in Canada 
and Great Britain, which means that the risks to free expres-
sion would be greater in the United States than has been the 
case in those nations. 
Mistakes, one might think, are obviously bad. Yet, one can 
imagine circumstances in which a mistake about non-U.S. law 
would be harmless. Suppose a judge, reading some non-U.S. 
materials, finds in them—or believes she finds in them—an in-
teresting idea. The judge then develops a domestic rule of law 
provoked by her reflections on the idea she found elsewhere. So, 
for example, the judge might notice that various European 
courts and legal theorists have referred to the regulation of 
“quangos,” which, the judge thinks, are roughly similar to pub-
lic agencies controlled by politically-appointed boards but re-
sponsive to an important degree to constituencies outside the 
government.83 The judge thinks that the idea of the quango il-
luminates some important First Amendment problems pre-
sented by actions of public broadcasting systems or arts agen-
cies, and refers to European sources when explaining why her 
First Amendment doctrine is a sensible one. Here the judge 
could be completely mistaken about European law regarding 
quangos, her references badly askew, and yet the law she de-
velops might indeed be quite good.84 
In this example, the judge is referring to non-U.S. law as a 
source for her thinking. That is not how Justice Breyer referred 
to German law, and the difference is important. Justice Breyer 
argued that experience under German law showed that certain 
ways of organizing federal governments worked well. Getting 
the law right matters when the judge refers to non-U.S. law to 
identify the consequences of alternative rules. 
Of course, proponents of these references do not defend us-
ing them badly or ignorantly. Perhaps ignorance could be recti-
fied by educating judges through formal programs85 and 
through presentation of appropriate material in briefs.86 Yet, 
 
 83. I draw the example from Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Compara-
tive Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1257–64 (1999). 
 84. I am grateful to Suzanne Stone for pointing out this possibility. 
 85. Since 1996, the Yale Law School has hosted a Global Constitutional-
ism Seminar, which has brought together constitutional court judges from 
around the world for programs of mutual education. See YLS Hosts Global 
Constitutionalism Seminar, YALE L. REP., Winter 2004, at 4–6, available at 
http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/pdf/Public_Affairs/NiB.pdf. 
 86. Cf. Young, supra note 34, at 166 (“[N]either advocates nor judges have 
yet invested the resources necessary to bring comparative analysis up to the 
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the marginal improvement in decision making that comes from 
referring to non-U.S. law might not be great enough to justify 
the cost of these educational efforts. The fact that Justice 
Breyer, a sophisticated proponent of reference to non-U.S. law, 
made a rather large mistake suggests that the educational task 
is quite substantial. We might be better off discouraging judges 
from referring to non-U.S. law, thereby saving the cost of the 
educational efforts and losing only the possibility of small and 
occasional improvements in the quality of constitutional inter-
pretation. Quality-control efforts are costly, and we ought to be 
sure that we are getting real improvements in overall output 
when we put another piece of decision-making machinery to 
work.87 
Those who defend the practice of referring to non-U.S. law 
do have one reasonable response to this version of the quality-
control objection: the quality-control problem associated with 
references to non-U.S. law is neither distinctive to such refer-
ences, nor, relatively speaking, terribly large. Nobody who 
knows anything about pension law thinks that Supreme Court 
Justices do a good job interpreting the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act,88 but we let them do it anyway, and hope 
that they can be educated to the point where they do the job ac-
ceptably. The example is not quite apt, because the Justices 
must interpret that Act but need not refer to non-U.S. law. So, 
consider some other optional interpretive methods. First, the 
role of neoclassical economics in antitrust law: judges have 
 
standards of rigor that we demand of arguments grounded in domestic law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 87. For a cautious judgment on what the cost-benefit analysis might yield, 
see id. at 166–67. The costs may take the form of opportunity costs. Consider 
an attorney who must submit a brief limited to fifty pages. Discussion of non-
U.S. law will displace something, and it may be that the lost material would 
have contributed more to the judge’s deliberation than the material on non-
U.S. law. Yet, even here the costs might be self-limiting: the attorney should 
be able to make the judgment about how to allocate space in the brief and con-
clude that, even though judges seem to like material on non-U.S. law, her cli-
ent’s interests would be better served by saving the space for discussion of 
something else. Additionally, coordination with groups filing amicus curiae 
briefs might further reduce the opportunity costs. 
 88. The statute is found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1467 (2000). For a reference 
to critical commentary on the Court’s performance, see John H. Langbein, 
What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail of Error in 
Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003). Professor 
Langbein observes that these three Supreme Court ERISA cases “have been 
greeted with despair in the scholarly and practitioner literature,” and provides 
references to that literature. Id. at 1320 & n.15. 
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gone to great lengths to learn enough to be even marginally lit-
erate in economics, but few scholars think it inappropriate for 
judges who have just learned a little neoclassical economics to 
use that knowledge in antitrust cases. Second, consider the 
proposition, common to “pragmatist” judges, that one important 
component of the choice between alternative legal rules is an 
assessment of the likely consequences of the alternatives. Seri-
ous social scientists know that determining a legal rule’s effects 
is extremely difficult, and comparing the effects of alternatives 
harder still.89 These difficulties, though, have not kept judges 
from treating possible effects as relevant to their job. Finally, it 
is commonplace to observe that the Court’s originalist interpre-
tations quite often make poor historical essays; yet, again, we 
think that originalist interpretation is well within bounds.90 It 
does not seem to me that judges who refer to non-U.S. law are 
likely to make more systematic or significant errors than 
judges who use neoclassical economics or assess conse-
quences.91 
There is, of course, a learning curve with respect to any 
form of knowledge, from microeconomics to history to non-U.S. 
law. In my opinion the curve is not that steep, but even if it is, 
the scholarly infrastructure is developing to enable judges to 
learn about non-U.S. law and its uses, just as they have 
learned microeconomics. 
Counseling judges to try to avoid making mistakes does 
not, in principle, challenge the practice of referring to non-U.S. 
law. A stronger version of the concern for error, closely related 
to the “relativism” criticism, does. In this version, the critics 
 
 89. For criticisms of Judge Posner’s pragmatism, in part on the ground 
that its pragmatic embrace of empiricism is not empirical enough, see Jeremy 
Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 597 (2000) (reviewing RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)); John 
Mikhail, Book Note, Law, Science, and Morality: A Review of Richard Posner’s 
The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057 (2002). 
 90. Cf. Young, supra note 34, at 166 ( “[T]hese competence concerns paral-
lel arguments against the use of history in originalist constitutional interpre-
tation.”). 
 91. Perhaps the concern is that we should do what we can to thwart the 
introduction of a new source of sloppiness even though we have come to live 
with mistakes and sloppiness in using neoclassical economics and the like. 
This is a strategic question about what can be done to improve the quality of 
judicial decision making, and in my judgment, targeting references to non-U.S. 
law is less likely to achieve those improvements than targeting other sources 
of sloppiness and error. Perhaps, though, this is no more than a question 
about the allocation of tasks among the Court’s critics. Some will go after ref-
erences to non-U.S. law, others the use of neoclassical economics. 
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question whether there really are “common legal problems” at 
all. Here it is helpful to distinguish between two kinds of refer-
ences. One, exemplified by Justice Breyer’s reference to Ger-
man federalism, implicates institutional arrangements; the 
other, exemplified by the critics’ view of Atkins and Roper, im-
plicates constitutional provisions attempting to implement ba-
sic human rights. Each type of reference presents different con-
cerns about the commonality of legal problems between 
countries. 
Professor Jackson suggests—as does Justice Breyer’s er-
ror—that references to non-U.S. law may be particularly diffi-
cult when the task is to interpret constitutional provisions deal-
ing with institutional arrangements.92 Such provisions “are 
often peculiarly the product of political compromise in histori-
cally situated moments, generally designed as a practical 
rather than a principled accommodation of competing inter-
ests.”93 Institutional arrangements tend to be tightly interre-
lated, sometimes in nonobvious ways. Federalism issues will be 
different in nations with separation-of-powers systems and na-
tions with parliamentary systems, for example; questions of ex-
ecutive authority will be different in systems with proportional 
representation and those where seats in the legislature go to 
winners in local districts.94 
For many, the case seems to be different with respect to 
questions of human rights.95 As they see it, such questions in-
 
 92. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Com-
parative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 272–73 (2001). 
 93. Id. at 273. 
 94. Id. (“[N]ot only are federal systems agreed to as a compromise, but the 
compromise typically constitutes an interrelated ‘package’ of arrangements.”). 
Professor Jackson also mentions differences in constitutional language: 
That the Supreme Court of Canada has construed the Canadian na-
tional government’s power over “trade or commerce” quite narrowly 
(for example, not to extend to labeling requirements for products in a 
single industry) may have little bearing on the proper scope of the 
United States Congress’s power to regulate “interstate and foreign 
commerce,” in part because interpretation of the Canadian “trade and 
commerce” power has been influenced by the enumerated powers of 
the Canadian provinces over property and civil rights, an enumera-
tion absent from the United States Constitution. 
Id. at 272–73 (citation omitted). I would not place much emphasis on this 
point, because constitutional language will almost always differ from one con-
stitution to another. 
 95. See, e.g., id. at 272 (“[Q]uestions of freedom of speech, freedom from 
torture, or freedom of religion [are] questions involving individual rights that 
widely are viewed as having some degree of universal character.”). 
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deed raise issues “common” to all legal systems worthy of being 
called democratic. And, perhaps, courts in all such systems are 
striving to reach the ultimate goal of a single, universally cor-
rect definition of what freedom of speech and the like, means in 
particular circumstances—or, at least, a single, universally cor-
rect verbal formulation of the criteria for determining when 
freedom of speech has been violated.96 
Here, I think the critics are right in principle, although 
wrong to think that Justices who have referred to non-U.S. law 
actually make such references on the premise that human 
rights are universal. Professor Alford notes the connection be-
tween the view that human rights are universal and the natu-
ral law tradition, which seems to be discredited as a theory of 
constitutional interpretation.97 Or, in Professor Anderson’s 
terms,98 it is unclear what we know about universal human 
rights when we learn that India treats affirmative action as no 
violation of human rights but actually an implementation of 
them;99 or that international human rights documents treat 
hate speech, and not its regulation, as a violation of human 
rights.100 One can believe that all courts are working toward 
universally applicable rules and remain baffled by the question, 
“Who is closer to the goal, they or we?” 
And, finally, one can hold that belief and still think that le-
gal problems operate on a different level, requiring the applica-
tion of perhaps universal norms in particular situations by spe-
cific institutions. Identifying the universal norm may be less 
important than being sensitive to the particularities of the 
situation and the institutions, such that a judge would do bet-
ter ignoring the findings of judges faced with different situa-
tions and institutions. 
 
 96. See, e.g., DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 171–73 
(2004) (arguing that all courts should, and many do, apply a test of propor-
tionality to determine when legislation violates human rights). 
 97. Alford, supra note 15, at 659–73. 
 98. Anderson, supra note 8, at 41 (“[W]hat is the information that . . . is 
acquired in this process?”). 
 99. See Tushnet, supra note 82, at 655–56. 
 100. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20, ¶ 2, 
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 368 (“Any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostil-
ity or violence shall be prohibited by law.”); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 4(a), adopted Dec. 21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 (“States Parties . . . [s]hall declare an offence punish-
able by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or ha-
tred . . . .”). 
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Having said all this, it is important to emphasize that the 
actual practice that has generated discussion of references to 
non-U.S. law makes only the tiniest gestures toward the idea 
that non-U.S. judgments can help identify universal norms. At-
kins101 and Roper102 refer to non-U.S. law to determine if the 
majority’s judgment—that imposition of the death penalty in 
those cases is cruel and unusual—is inconsistent with views 
elsewhere. The primary reference to non-U.S. law in Lawrence 
v. Texas103 was to refute the suggestion made by Chief Justice 
Burger that homosexual sodomy was universally condemned in 
the Western tradition, not to demonstrate that homosexual 
sodomy was (universally) regarded as falling outside the proper 
domain of government. 
Critics do not seem to believe that judges making non-U.S. 
law references have a limited vision of the relevance of those 
references,104 perhaps because they know that advocates out-
side the courts have more capacious projects in mind. Until we 
 
 101. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002). 
 102. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005). 
 103. Justice Kennedy wrote for the Lawrence majority:  
  Chief Justice Burger joined the opinion for the Court in Bowers 
and further explained his views as follows: “Decisions of individuals 
relating to homosexual conduct have been subject to state interven-
tion throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation of 
those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical 
standards.” . . . 
  . . . . 
  The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of 
Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and ethical stan-
dards did not take account of other authorities pointing in an opposite 
direction. . . . 
  Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was de-
cided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with 
parallels to . . . today’s case. . . . [T]he decision is at odds with the 
premise in Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in 
our Western civilization. 
539 U.S. 558, 571–73 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 104. Cf. Anderson, supra note 8, at 41 (“It is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that the determination of other people—other places, other legal systems, 
other sovereign orders—that it is deeply and grotesquely wrong to impose a 
penalty of death speaks deeply to the urbane, cosmopolitan, civilized Justice 
Breyer.”). But cf. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 265 (1999) (Breyer, J., join-
ing the opinion of the Court affirming the denial of habeas corpus in a death 
penalty case); Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88, 90 (1998) (Breyer, J., joining 
the opinion of the Court reversing the grant of habeas corpus in a death pen-
alty case); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 750 (1996) (Breyer, J., join-
ing the opinion of the Court affirming a conviction in a case challenging the 
constitutionality of the death penalty on separation-of-powers grounds). 
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have more evidence, though, I believe we should take the 
judges at their word. They have not—yet—said that the U.S. 
Constitution instantiates universal human rights, whose con-
tents can be determined by examining the decisions of non-U.S. 
tribunals along with other sources. 
CONCLUSION 
There are some problems with the way some Justices have 
referred to non-U.S. law, most of which could be dealt with 
through more careful attention. And, of course, there are ways 
of using non-U.S. law that would be quite problematic. But, in 
general, the criticisms of the Court’s actual practice are greatly 
overstated. Political scientists, sociologists, and historians are 
more likely to shed light on the controversy over the practice 
than are legal scholars. 
